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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The land in question claimed by the appellants
is situated in San Juan County, Utah, and is accurately described in appellants' brief at page 4.
The land was patented on June 13, 1922. The patentee, Tomas Velarde, after receiving the patent on
the ground in 1922 failed to pay taxes to San Juan
County. As a result the land was sold to San Juan
County on March 25, 1927, by an Auditor's Tax
Deed. In 1941 J. M. Bailey, predecessor in title
and interest of plaintiffs and respondents herein,
purchased the land from San Juan County, and a
Tax Deed was issued by San Juan County to J. N.
Bailey on December 12, 1941. Since that date the
plaintiffs and their predecessors in title and interest have been in exclusive and ope11 possession of
the land and have cultivated the land, planted crops
thereo11, harvested the same, used the land for grazing purposes and broke up ground and improved
the same which was adapted to cultivation and enclosed the la11d with a substantial fence. From 1941
to date plaintiffs a11d their predecessors in title and
interest haYc paid or redeemed all of the taxes assessed against tl1e property. As stated in appellants' brief there are no 4 consecutive years where
the property taxes were paid before the~r became
delinquent, but tl1e taxes that ,yere allowed to go
delinque11t were al,vay·s redee111ed before there was
an~y Ma~y sale COllYe)'"iilg tl1e 11roperty· to San Juan
Co11nty.
The appellants asserted or <"lai111ed no possession
from 1927 when the Auditor's Tax Deed 'vas issued
4
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conveying the property to San Juan County. Tomas
Velarde and his heirs have paid no taxes on the
property since it was patented in 1922. Plaintiffs
then filed this quiet title action and after a period
of 29 years from the date the Auditor's Tax Deed
was issued the appellant then comes into Court and
asserts title in behalf of herself and as the Administratrix of her father's estate.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
In connection with the appeal the appellants
have argued their case under 3 separate points. For
the purpose of replying to the argument of appellants respo11dents will ansvver each of appellant's
points and then submit argument supporting the
respondent's points which are as follows:
1. Defendants are barred from asserting any
right, title or interest to the land or from setting up
any defense to plaintiff's complaint by the 4 year
statute of limitations where the property is acquired
under tax title.
2. Defendants are barred from asserting any
right, title or interest to the land or from setting
up any defense to plaintiff's complaint by the general 7 year statute of limitations.
3. Plai11tiffs have a valid title to the property
under the 4 year statute of limitations on tax titles
plus exclusive possession during this period and the
payment of taxes during the 4 year period.

ANSWER TO .APPELLANTS' ARGUMENT
Defendants' point No. 1 is that ''payment of
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taxes each year for the statutory period before they
become delinquent is necessary to establish title by
.adverse possession.'' In answer to this point plaintiffs recognize that the Utah case of Bowen vs. Olsen,
268 P. 2d 983, 2 U (2d) 12, holds that redemption
of taxes is not equivilant to the payment of taxes
before they become delinquent and that this case is
·against plaintiff's contention on this point. The
Bowen vs. Olsen case, however, was decided in 1954
construing the law as it applied lrnder the old Section 104-2-12 UCA 1943. This section now has been
amended and is now Section 78-12-12 U CA 1953.
The amendment was made in the 1951 session laws
Chapter 19. In this amendment an additional proviso was enacted providing for sitllations where
the property was acquired under a tax title. The
wording in this proviso added by this amendment is
slightly different fro1n the wordll1g of the old section which was amended and the Bowen vs. Olsen
case is not necessarily controling where there has
been adverse possession and payme11t of taxes since
the amendment of this particular section. Additional
argument will be presented in cliscllssing pla.i11tiffs'
poi11t No. 3 later on i11 this Brief.
As point No. 2 defendants elain1 "The plaintiffs still have the bl1rrle11 of provi11g a.ll elements
of adverse possessio11 despite the 1951 ailleildil1ents
to tl1e stat11te relating to li1nitatio11 of a~__·tiol1S." The
11ew Sectio11s enac-ted i11 Cha l)ter 19.. 1951 session
laws whieh are now Seetions 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2
UCA 1953 as they r0late to titles aeq11ired 11nder tax
sale were <'naeted speeifieall~~ to elin1inate tl1e llroblelns ariRiug nndrr the old statutes i11 lllJl1oldi11g tax
6
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deeds. These new sections are both statutes of limitation which prevent the imposing of a defense or
asserting the right to real property by the original
owner against someone that holds under a tax title .
Under these 2 sections enacted in 1951 it is not 11ow
necessary for the holder of a tax title to sl1ow all of
the elements of adverse possession in order to defeat the title of the original ow11er and his st1ceessors
in interest before the land was sold to the Oountv
for nonpayme11t of taxes. Tl1is point will be further
discussed by plaintiffs in their arguments supporting points 1 and 2.
OJ

Under point 2 defenda11ts claim that the plaintiffs should have pleaded the statute of limitations
or had the san1e covered in a pre-trial order. As
pointed ot1t by the Utah Stlpreme Court i11 Hanse11
vs. Morris 283 P. 2d 884, 3 U (2d) 310, under r11le
7(a) the plaintiff has no authorized pleading tlnder
this rule to set up the statute of limitations. Defenda11t did not file a counterclai1n or a cross coinplaint and her answer completed the pleadings allowed under this rule. The sitt1atio11 in the instant
case is the same as in tl1e Hansen vs. Morris case
wherein this Court held that the plaintiffs did 11ot
have to affirmatively plead the statute of limitations
in order to claim the benefits of this statute.
Defendant also mentions under point No.2 tl1at
there is a presumption of possession in tl1e legal
title holder. This presumption is rebutted by direet
evidence at the trial that the plaintiffs and their
}Jredecessors in interest and title had actually oecupied, grazed, c·ultivated, planted, farmed a11d har7
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vested crops froin tl1is particular land si11ce 1941
when the property was conveyed to J. N. Bailey by
San Juan County.
Defendant claims as Point No. 3 ''There is no
proof that tl1e plaintiffs are 'holders of a tax title'
within the meaning of the statute." The deed from
San Juan County to J. N. Bailey which is dated December 12, 1941, a11d appears at page
of the
abstract of title is certainly a tax title as defined
i11 Section 78-12-5.3 UCA 1953, which sectio11 was
e11aeted under Chapter 19 of the 1951 sessio11 laws.
r_rhis conveya11ce from San J ua11 County comes within the provisions of this Section which states that
a tax title includes any title whether valid or dt>rived through or dependant upon any sale, conve~T
ance of transfer of such property in the cotlrse of a
statutory proceeding for the liq11idation of any ta~~
levied against st1ch property "\vhereby the property
is released from a tax lien. The tax deed from Sa11
Juan County recites tl1at the pro1Jert~T \vas received
py the County for 11011payment of taxes and recites
that a11 Auditor's Tax Deed \vas issued eonve}ing
the property to San Juan County a11d the Deed fron1
the County to J. N. Bailey was a further tra11sfer
of the property whirh relieved the la11d i11 q11estion
from the orginal tax lien. Tl1e reql1ire111e11ts set
forth in this Sectio11 etre met b~T a11 ..A. uditor's Tax
Deed or a Deed at the ~ra~T sale or a Deed fro1n the
Connty to a JHlrr baser after th8 1\ Ia:T sale.
As conclusio11s defendants ask that the lo\ver
Co11rt be reversed a n rl tl1a t a Deer('le he (~lltere'l
a.~·ainst the plaintiffs in fayor of tl1e {teft=•n(iant~
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and appellants herein adjt1dgi11g and decreeing that
defendants are the owners in fee simple of the land
involved in the Stlit. In this demand defe11dants exceed the prayer of their complaint. In the prayer
of their complaint defendants do not ask for any
affirmative relief but only ask that the plaintiffs
take nothing by their Complaint. Defendants only
filed an Answer, and there is no Counter Clain1 or
Cross Complaint. Defendants are, therefore, 11ot
entitled to any affirmative relief, a11d there should
be no Decree quieting title in the defendants, even
if the court found that plaintiffs were not entitled
to have title quieted i11 the1n. The most that could
be do11e wot1ld be to send the case bacl{ for new trial
or to set aside the Findings and Decree Qt1ieting
Title in the Plaintiffs.
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS'
POINTS
POINT 1
DEFENDANTS ARE BARRED FROlVI ASSERTING ANY RIGHT, TITLE OR INTEREST
TO THE LAND OR FROM SETTING UP ANY
DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT BY
THE 4 YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
WHERE THE PROPERrry IS ACQUIRED UNDER TAX TITLE.
Sections 78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2, UCA, 1953,
set up the 4 year statute of limitations agai11st tl1e
original owner where property has been acqt1ired
under tax title and is held and possessed by tl1e Ile\v
9
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tax title purchaser. These two sections were formerly Sections 104-2-5 and 104-2-5.10 of the 1943 code
as a1nended and enacted by Chapter 19 of the 1951
session laws. Section 78-12-5.3, UCA, 1953, which
was formerly Section 104-2-5.11 of the 1943 code enacted by Chapter 19 of the 1951 session laws defines
what is a tax title. In order to come within this
definition the tax title does not have to be valid.
In the words of this section it states ''Whether
valid or not. '' The tax ti tie under these 3 sections
quoted in this paragraph originated by the Auditor's
Tax Deed issued to San Juan Collnty in 1927. This
Auditor's Tax Deed by its very terms is one of the
instruments issued wl1ere the original owner has
failed to pay the taxes and they have gone delinqllei1t for a period of 4 years ~fter which time the
County was authorized to isslle a:n Auditor's _Tax
Deed co11Ve?i11g the property to San Jua11 County.
The Tax Deed from San Juan County to J. N.
Bailey, dated December 12, 1941, is another instrulnent "\\ hich transfers a tax title withi11 the n1eaning· of that tern1 in the sections hereinabove quoted.
l~l1is Tax Deed from San Juan Count~~ recites that
the taxes were delinqllent, the~~ \Yel·e not redee111ed
and that an Auditor's Tax Deed was isslled and
that this particular tax title deed fron1 Sa11 Juan
County was issued by· reaso11 thereof. Plai11tiffs and
their predecessors i11 title a11d i11terest l1ave bee11 in
actual possessio11 of th~ la11d si11ee December 12~
1941, a11d l1ave occupied, far111ed and grazed tl1e aren
eo11tinually sinee tl1en. Defenda11ts l1aYe 11ot been
in I)OSsession of the~ ]and sinre prior to 1927 and
rnake no <·lain:l that they· \Vere.
7

10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The lower Court fot111d that plaintiffs' title was
derived froin a tax title more than 4 years prior to
bringing this action and that plaintiffs and their
predecessors have been in possession to the exclllsion of defendants since 1941. There is an abunda11ce
of evidence to support the findings by tl1e trial cot1rt
to bring tl1e case u11der these t\NO statutes of lirnitation and the trial cot1rt should be instructed tl1erei11.
.
.As pointed out previously in this Brief tl1ese
two sections are strictly statutes of limitation and by
their terms prevent a plai11tiff from asserting a clai111
or a defendant frorn asserti11g a defe11se "\Yl1ere s1rcl1
plaintiff or defendant has not been in possessio11 of
the property withi11 a period of 4 years after tl1e
land has been acquired under a tax title hy another
party. These two sectio11s, now 78-12-5.1 a11d 78-125.2, UCA, 1953, say no_thing of the payme11t of taxes
and do not require the payment of taxes as 011e of
the conditions under which the statutes could be imposed as a statt1te of li111itatio11S to preve11t the asserting of a claim or defense to the recovery or possession of real pro1)er(y.
The fact sit-uation in the instant case squarely
comes within the provisions of tl1e fact situatior1 as
set forth in Hansen vs. Morris, 283 P 2d 884, 3 U
(2d) 310, herein before quoted wherein this court
upheld the constitutionality of these 2 sectio11s relied upon by plaintiffs and stated that they were
enacted as statutes of li1nitatio11s and for the sperifie
pu.rpose to prevent the raising of defenses in tax
title cases based on failure to comply v1ith the statuatory stel)S leading to the issuance of the tax deeds.

11
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In referring to these two sections the court states:
''Another effort to provide a statute of
limitations designed to validate tax titles was
made by passage of Chapter 19, 104-2, Laws of
Utah 1951, 78-12-5.2, U.C.A. 1953, Pocket Supplement, the two sections of which are alone important so far as this case is concerned a11cl
which read as follows: . . . ''
''It appears obvious that such sections
were enacted to eliminate the objections pointed
out in the Toronto case, and were intended to
prevent raising of defenses based on failure
to comply with statutory steps leading down
the long road traversable in perfecting tax titles,
unless 01~e cla1:ming a better title, assert his
rights within four years after a document of
transfer, valid on its face, has been executed
and delivered 'in the course of a statutory proceeding for the liquidation of a.ny tax levied
against *** property whereby the property is
relieved from a tax lien.' ''
(Emphasis added)
POINT 2

DEFENDANTS ARE BAR.R.ED FRO~I ASC:ERTAINING ANY RIGHT~ TITLE OR IX'eEREST TO THE LAND OR FR.OM SETTING
UP ANY DEFENSE TO PLAINTIFFS' CO:i\IPLAINT BY THE GENER.AL 7 YEAR. ST.A_TUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
These sa1ne sectio11s me11tio11ed abo,~e~ 78-12-5.1
a11d 78-12-5.2~ U01\~ 195~1~ g:iv~ a g·e11era.l statntlJ of
limitation~ for a 7 y(•ar l)~riod and tl1e 7 ytJar featn r<~ of thP ~anH\ Rtn tn tes also bn rs tl1e defe11dants
fro1n aRRPrtbtg· tlH•ir elai1u in this aetio11. Plaintiffs

12
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have been in possession a11d more than 7 years has
expired since the Tax Deed was issued to the plai11tiffs in 1941. The argument supporting plai11tiffs'
point No. 1 is also applicable to this 7 year statute
of limitations. The only difference betvveen tl1e 2
provisions of the said statutes is the lJeriod of time.

POINT 3
PLAINTIFFS HAVE A VALID TITLE rl"'O
THE PROPERTY UNDER THE 4 YEAR ST.f:LTUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON TAX TITI_jE
PLUS EXCLUSIVE POSSESSION DURING
'l1 HIS PERIOD AND THE PAYNIENT OF
TAXES DURING THE 4 YEAR PERIOD.
In addition to the defendant being barred by
the 4 year statute of li1nitations on tax titles and
the general 7 year statute of limitations, both discussed a b o v e, in plaintiffs' points Nos. 1 and 2,
plaintiffs have initiated a new and valid title by being in open, 11otoriot1s and adverse possession of
said property since 1941 and paying the taxes for
more than 4 years.
As previously stated in this Brief in a11swer t\'
defendants' argument since 1941 the plai11tiffs a11d
their predecessors in title and interest have paid all
the taxes before the due date for each year or redeemed them before the iviay sale for each and every
year since the property was purchased from San
~T uan County. The questio11 of whether the reden1ption of taxes dt1ring the redemption period is snffitient to comply vv-ith the requirements of the statute of limitations was prPvion:~ly disclisscd h~:.'" thiR
1,•)
)
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Court in Bowe11 vs. Olsen, supra. In that case the
Court recognizes that there is a division of authority
among the different jurisdictions. The Supreme
Court of Utah adopted the majority view that redemption of taxes is not equivalent to the payment of
taxes before delinquent and is not sufficient to comply with the statute of limitations on adverse possession. Since this case was decided in 1954 other
jurisd1ctions have considered the matter and the
latest annotation in ALR is found in 50 ALR 2d
592 wherein is annotated a Virginia case of Thomas
vs. Young 196 Virginia 1166, 87 SE 2d 127. In this
case the Virginia Supreme Court held that redemption of taxes was sufficient to comply· with the requirements of the adverse possession statutes and
the Court held that a forfeiture of lien to the comID011Wealth for nonpayment of taxes, being intended
merely to create an i11defeasible lien for· their collectioi1, does not eo11stitute a break in the required
continuity of adverse possession. Following this
case at Note 5 u11der the heading "Adverse Possessiol1 Held 11ot Interrupted" are a11notated cases
from the States of Massachusetts, Texas~ :Jiississippi
and lVIinnesota as all Sllpporting this view.
We respectfully· submit that the reasoning of
the Virginia, California, ~Iontana and other Courts
holding that redemption does not interrupt the runJling of the statt1te is the better Yie\\... The reasons
given under the majority· a11d I11i11ority view are
fully discussed i11 the argun1ent of the Bowe11 YS.
Olse11 case, a11d it wo11ld be superfltlOllS to add to
that at this time Qxeept to point Ollt that fro111 a
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practical standpoint a land ovvner who has the record title of land in his name does not lose his land
or any rights to it by allowing the taxes to become
deli11quent and redeeming them before the 1\tlay sale.
The very purpose of redemption is to allow a period
of time for the owner to pay his taxes where econo1nic
difficulties prevent him from paying them the Cllrrent year before they become delinquent. I11 redeeming he pays all the taxes that have been assessed
plus the penalty and interest that is added to the
original amou11t because they vvere not paid on the
dl1e date. If the land owner chooses to pa~r the
taxes after the current year and pay tl1e penalty and
interest he should not thereby be jeopardized in his
ownership of the land. The tax sale to the County
on January 10 following the due date of November
30 does not divest title from the orginal o"\vner bllt
is as the term implies a preliminary tax sale whicl1
gives the County a lien for the collectio11 of the taxes
due. There is no cha11ge in ownership of the land, 110
change in possession and we submit there, therefore,
should be no break in the required continuity for
adverse possession where payment of taxes is required.
We, therefore, respectfully submit that the
Court should reconsider the position taken in the
Bowen vs. Olsen case and that the jllrisdictions l1olding that redemption of taxes does not constit11te a
breal{ in the required continuity for adverse possession is the better reasoned vievv.
The trial court, therefore, properly fot1nd that
plaintiffs' title had been pllrchased from Sa11 Juan
County by tax deed i11 1941, tl1at this title was a tax

15
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title, that plaintiffs had been in open, notorious and
adverse possession of the property continuously since
1941 and had paid all taxes on the propery since
1941 and that defendants had not been in possession
during this period of time. Pursuant to the Findings the Court properly declared that the plaintiffs
were the onwers of this property. There is a1npJe
evidence to support the Court findings as detailed
above.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Defendant is barred from asserting any defense to plaintiffs' complaint or from asserting any
right, title or interest in said pro}Jerty by reason of
the 4 year statute of limitations on tax titles and
also by reason of the general 7 year statute of limitations.
2. Plaintiff has established a good a11d valid
title by adverse possession and

pa~rment

of taxes

under tl1e 4 year statute of limitations on tax titles.
3. There was ample evidence to support plaintiffs' findings and the trial co11rt 's fi11di11gs and decree sho11ld he sustai11ed .
. 4. Even if the lower co11rt is 11ot sustai11ed, the
ea~P

sl1011ld be re1nanded bacl{ for furtl1er proceed-
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ings for a new trial and for proceedings in accordance with Section 59-10-65, UCA, 1953.
Respectfully submitted,

FRANDSEN AND KELLER
By Duane A. Frandsen
72 West Main
Price, Utah
Attorneys fo1" Plaintiffs
and Respondents
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